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Introduction  
 
Since September 11th 2001, radicalisation and efforts to combat it have been a significant 
focus of activity and investment for governments worldwide. Despite wide variation in 
theoretical approaches to radicalisation - and consequently in understandings of what is 
                                                 
1 The author would like to thank Gavin Bailey for the inspiration, the organisers and participants at the Società 
Italiana di Scienza Politica conference 2019 for useful discussion, and Phil Burton-Cartledge and two 
anonymous reviewers for valuable critiques and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies. 
2 Corresponding Author Contact: Phil Edwards, Email: p.j.edwards@mmu.ac.uk, Manchester Metropolitan 
University, All Saints, Manchester M15 6BH 
Abstract 
This paper proposes that, instead of framing radicalisation as a process undergone 
by individuals, society’s political sphere as a whole should be be considered as a 
site of radicalisation: a social setting built on discourses which can themselves be 
characterised by their level(s) of ‘radicalism’. The radicalisation of individuals’ 
patterns of discursive action needs to be understood in the context of (changing) 
levels of societal radicalisation. Unless they also address this societal context, 
efforts to counter or forestall the radicalisation of individuals and groups can have 
only local and temporary success. Any counter-radicalisation intervention 
conducted purely on the basis of an individualised ‘contagion’ or ‘strain’ model 
will be unable to envision - let alone address - phenomena of societal 
radicalisation. Building on the literature on securitization, resilience and agonistic 
conflict, this paper offers a model of societal radicalisation and of the social and 
political conditions likely to foster this process. Societal radicalisation is seen in 
terms of the corrosion of agonistic politics and its replacement by antagonism; this 
is related to deficits in societal qualities of conflictuality and resilience, which are 
discussed. The radicalising drift from agonism to antagonism, when promoted at 
government level, is further related to the literature on securitisation. Lastly, one 
possible mechanism for societal radicalisation - ‘antagonistic amplification’ - is 
identified and directions for further work are suggested. 
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involved in deradicalisation - radicalisation is almost universally considered as a process 
undergone by individuals, with the political spectrum and institutions of their society serving 
primarily as backdrop. In this paper, radicalisation is considered instead as a process taking 
place within the political sphere of a society. While this society-focused model draws on 
much earlier literature - in particular, social movement scholars’ interaction-based 
understandings of radicalisation and terrorism - it is innovative in its stress on de-
individualised patterns of discursive action as the locus of radicalisation, and the target of 
deradicalisation. 
Using terminology developed by Chantal Mouffe, societal radicalisation is seen in 
terms of the corrosion of agonistic politics and its replacement by antagonism; this is related 
to deficits in societal qualities of conflictuality and resilience. Definitions of conflictuality and 
resilience related to the maintenance of agonistic political conflict are put forward; the 
concept of resilience used here also draws on the existing literature on resilience to 
radicalisation, at individual as well as societal level. The radicalising drift from agonism to 
antagonism, when promoted at government level, is further related to the literature on 
securitisation as a means of elevating contentious issues above normal politics. Lastly, a 
mechanism for societal radicalisation - ‘antagonistic amplification’ - is identified, together 
with possible historical examples, and directions for further work are suggested. 
 
Radicalisation: Individual Models 
 
The concept of societal radicalisation developed in this paper draws on a number of related 
literatures, but marks a break with dominant understandings of radicalisation. The role played 
by individuals in the process of radicalisation - both as radicalisers and as vulnerable subjects 
- has been articulated in multiple different ways, but the individual experience of 
radicalisation has generally been taken as central; even meso- and macro-level models of 
radicalisation tend to take the radicalisation of individuals as the explanandum, offering in 
effect models of the conditions which promote multiple cases of a phenomenon experienced 
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by individuals. This model considers a society and its political sphere, not as a setting within 
which the radicalisation of individuals take place, but as a locus for processes of radicalisation 
and de-radicalisation in its own right - processes which may find expression in individual, 
collective and state action. In short, this model de-individualises radicalisation. 
Radicalisation is a vexed concept; while there are persuasive arguments to the effect 
that it is a contentless placeholder, substituting for an explanation of the origins of terrorist or 
extremist activity (Coolsaet 2019), arguably radicalisation has been given form as well as 
substance by the range and volume of scholarly as well as policy literature centring on it 
(Malthaner 2017). Broadly, radicalisation can be defined as the process whereby individuals 
come to adopt personal violence as a political tactic, or – more generally – come to adopt 
political tactics and framings which are incompatible with the continued functioning of liberal 
democratic politics, e.g. the designation of democratic institutions as a target to be destroyed. 
In practice, most models of radicalisation can be divided into three groups. Firstly, 
many influential models foreground the experiences of the radicalised individual and the 
stages through which he or she passes en route to fully-accomplished radicalisation (see 
critical discussion in Veldhuis and Staun 2009:13-20). Some models stress the importance of 
contact with a recruiter, modelling radicalisation as a process of guided interaction akin to 
‘grooming’; a model like this underpins the widespread adoption of ‘safeguarding’ models in 
counter-extremism practice (Busher, Choudhury and Thomas 2019, Heath-Kelly and Strausz 
2019). Others focus on the role of ideology, locating the risk of radicalisation in an 
individual’s exposure to doctrines with a particularly close association with violent political 
practice; this type of model is reflected in the then British Prime Minister David Cameron’s 
assertion that “[i]t is not enough to target and go after violent extremists after they have 
become violent”, and that deradicalisation efforts must combat “all forms of extremism - not 
just violent extremism” (Cameron 2013).  
What these models have in common, despite their many differences, is the assumption 
that radicalisation is a set of changes in an individual initiated by contact with an outside 
influence. Thus, these can all be considered as contagion models (cf. the conclusion of 
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Conrad 1907). This assumption is reflected in the ‘crime prevention’ logic used by 
counter-radicalisation initiative, whereby radicalisation can be interrupted by separating 
potential offenders from their potential targets: radicalising predators are isolated and 
removed from society, while their ‘targets’ are offered reinforcement and support, with a view 
to reintegrating them into the social consensus to which they formerly belonged (Edwards 
2014). The appropriateness of any kind of micro-level deradicalising intervention is 
conditional on correct identification of the individuals involved; unless this can be guaranteed, 
the effects of intervention based on these models is liable to be stigmatising and 
discriminatory (Veldhuis and Staun 2009: 61-71). 
A second group of models broadens the focus from the individual, relating the 
radicalisation of individuals to its social setting. Again, three sub-types can be identified. 
Models relating extreme-right terrorism to immigration or the trend of government policy 
(Piazza 2017a) effectively situate radicalisation as a deviant form of politicisation; the 
radicalised individual is responding to political developments, but in forms and terms which 
take him or her outside the parameters of legitimate politics. Models relating radicalisation to 
(increasing) economic hardship or other forms of material disadvantage, secondly, situate 
radicalisation as a dysfunctional individual response to external stresses (Freytag et al 2009, 
Knigge 1998). A third type of model incorporates elements of the first two, situating 
radicalisation as a response to personal experiences experienced in politicised terms; 
according to these models, individuals may be particularly susceptible to radicalisation if they 
believe themselves to have been disadvantaged or ‘left behind’ by societal change favouring 
other social groups, as in Hochschild’s ‘deep story’ of the American Right situating women 
and non-Whites as queue-jumpers enabled by a distrusted Black president (Hochschild 2016: 
135-152; see also Piazza 2017a, Doering and Davies 2019). 
These models share a focus on the individual within his or her society, embarking on a 
trajectory of radicalisation in response to social changes. These changes may materially 
disadvantage the individual, change his or her social situation in unwelcome ways, or simply 
be unwelcome on political grounds; in all cases the individual is in some sense responding to 
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changes imposed on him or her. Thus, these can all be considered as strain models. Rather 
than identify deviant individuals, these approaches aim to identify conditions which make 
individuals more likely to become deviant. The breadth of these models is inevitably bought 
at the expense of precision and predictive power: wide variation is observed in how the 
postulated effects manifest themselves, with considerable variation between different national 
contexts (Doering and Davies 2019). More fundamentally, the assumption that radicalisation 
can be readily contrasted with non-deviant political action remains, and remains problematic. 
A third group of models partially departs from the dominant focus on individuals, 
analysing radicalisation in terms of collective political action. This is the case of the ‘bunch of 
guys’ model, which explains radicalisation as a collective process undergone by a culturally 
isolated group bound together by social ties; this can also be seen as a hybrid contagion/strain 
model, with the strain of the group members’ hostile social experiences making them 
vulnerable to the contagion of ideological conversion or a recruiter’s contact (Sageman 2004, 
2008, Hoffman 2008; compare Cottee 2011). The “social identification” approach advanced 
by Veldhuis and Staun has some similarities in its hybridity and stress on radicalisation as an 
interactive process (Veldhuis and Staun 2009). This group of approaches also includes those 
mid-range models which focus on within- and between-group dynamics in explaining the 
adoption of extreme politics and violent forms of action (McCauley and Moskalenko 
2008: 424-6; also see literature on ‘outbidding’, e.g. Tarrow 1989: 307-10, Edwards 2009: 
169-90). 
This group also includes those models which apply the tools of social movement 
analysis to the field of terrorism and radicalisation, whether by analogising supposed ‘waves’ 
of terrorism to the ‘cycles of contention’ analysed by social movement scholars (Harrow 
2008), or by considering terrorism as a form taken by contentious politics under particular 
conditions, viewing ‘terror’ not as the property of ‘terrorists’ but as a communicative tactic 
which can be adopted or abandoned by different contentious actors (Tilly 2005; see also 
discussion in Demetriou 2018). More generally, approaches like these make it possible to 
analyse episodes of terrorism together with non-violent episodes, identifying the various 
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contributions made by mobilising strategies, political opportunities and discursive framings, 
and mechanisms combining and articulating these basic tools in different ways (Alimi et al 
2012, Demetriou and Alimi 2018; cf. McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001, Tarrow 1998). 
These can be considered as group-based, or meso-level collective action models. For 
these models, it is the group rather than the individual which undergoes radicalisation - a 
process which may, moreover, be partial, reversible and repeatable. However, the theoretical 
advance over the other models is qualified. The radicalisation of groups is ultimately 
observable only through the actions which individuals carry out and justify in the group’s 
name; moreover, being considered as deviant political subjects, the groups themselves are 
contrasted with society more broadly, which figures as the arena within which they contend 
and the (legitimate) political structure which they hope to exploit. In short, despite their meso-
level focus, these models ultimately retain the individualism characteristic of the other two 
groups, and consequently reproduce the underlying assumption that radicalisation represents a 
form of political deviance which can be contrasted with ‘normal’ politics. 
 
Radicalisation: A Societal Model 
 
The model of societal radicalisation presented in this paper is a macro-level collective 
discursive action model. The concept of societal radicalisation is not entirely new: societies as 
a whole have sometimes been considered as a target for radicalisation, as in discussions of 
‘mass radicalisation’ (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008: 426-8). This model also builds on 
‘collective action’ models, and understandings of radicalisation from within the social 
movement sphere more generally – cf. della Porta’s formulation in which radicalisation is “a 
process of escalation from nonviolent to increasingly violent repertoires of action” (della 
Porta 2018: 462). Social movement scholars emphasise the importance of setting this process 
in its wider political context - “[a]ccording to social movement studies, radicalism or 
moderation in the forms of action is influenced mainly by the available structure of political 
opportunities” (della Porta 2018: 464). However, this model goes further, both in its emphasis 
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on discourse and in stressing that the discursive patterns of action themselves, rather than 
individuals or groups, are the objects of radicalisation – the things that are radicalised. As 
such, radicalisation necessarily involves those established political actors who through their 
interactions construct ‘the available structure of political opportunities’ as well as the social 
movement actors who find their conditions for action within that opportunity structure. 
The key assumptions of the model are as follows. Firstly, radicalisation takes place 
within a society’s political sphere. A society’s political sphere has a core and a periphery; the 
core is defined here as the complex of more or less bureaucratic entities and processes within 
which politics as a specialised activity takes place, while the periphery encompasses all other 
social activities generally classified as political, from voting through political protest to 
terrorism. The boundaries of the political sphere vary from one society to another, as they are 
the boundaries of what is accepted as political. A society’s political sphere, as a whole, thus 
encompasses its political institutions, its range of accepted political behaviours and the 
accepted types of political actor, action, political demand, political motif and framing.  
If radicalisation takes place within the political sphere, what is radicalised is the 
patterns of discursive action which constitute the political sphere. While political 
assumptions, beliefs, thematic combinations of ideas and framings can be considered as 
elements of individuals’ patterns of thought and discourse, they are also embedded in, and to 
varying degrees continuous with, the discourses of the various overlapping social groups 
which individuals inhabit (including local, workplace, kinship and religious groups as well as 
the larger and more fluid groups defined by shared access to mass media and social media). 
Discursive patterns of belief, and changes in those patterns, are accessible to individual 
consciousness and can be modified in use - indeed, changes in societal patterns of discourse 
take place through changing patterns of individual usage - but these patterns are not external 
to, or prior to, consciousness. To the extent that they are perpetuated, discursive patterns are 
perpetuated through speech and action by individuals, but they are largely perpetuated 
unreflectively; when they are modified, the modified patterns succeed to the extent that they 
in turn are perpetuated unreflectively. While individuals’ own discursive repertoires change as 
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the discursive interactions in which they participate change; it would not be appropriate to say 
that individuals are ‘influenced’ or ‘affected’ by these changes, barring unusually heightened 
levels of reflective self-awareness. 
Earlier, radicalisation was defined in individualistic terms, as the process whereby 
individuals adopt political tactics and framings which are incompatible with the continued 
functioning of liberal democratic politics, e.g. the adoption of personal violence as a tactic. If 
radicalisation is considered as a phenomenon of discursive practice, this definition can be 
adopted with one major qualification, which is that individuals are not the focus. 
Radicalisation, in this model, is a process taking place within the political sphere, and simply 
denotes the development and adoption of political tactics and framings incompatible with 
liberal democracy. 
Other established findings can also be adopted. Radicalisation may be reciprocal, 
cumulative or both. Reciprocal radicalisation develops through a process of increasingly 
antagonistic interaction between political opponents; cumulative radicalisation is a series of 
“actions ... associated with other actions and reactions, often expressed in some sort of 
reciprocal relationship” (Taylor and Horgan 2012: 130). Individuals may experience a series 
of ‘micro-radicalisations’ within their established patterns of discursive interaction, being 
prompted by particular events or encounters to adopt more violent, aggressive or 
confrontational tactics and framings; these small changes may be undone by equally small-
scale deradicalisation experiences, or may cumulatively lead to a decisive, and harder to 
reverse, process of radicalisation (Bailey and Edwards 2017). These micro-radicalisations – 
and deradicalisations – also take place (continually) on larger scales, with the adoption of 
slightly more or less antagonistic framings and tactics by collectivities which function as 
discursive political actors: protest groups, political parties (and groups within them), trade 
unions, police forces, corporations, governments, etc. (A micro-radicalisation is a small 
movement towards radicalisation; there is no contradiction in the idea of large-scale micro-
radicalisations.) 
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The political sphere of any society can be assumed to have a degree of stability over 
time, with the institutionalised core in particular having a tendency to self-reproduce and to 
perpetuate itself broadly unchanged. Discursive radicalisation can thus be seen as a 
maladaptive - and ultimately self-destructive - mutation in the political sphere’s reproduction 
of itself. More specifically, societal radicalisation is considered here as a process in which 
agonistic conflict is progressively replaced with antagonism. The terms ‘agonism’ and 
‘antagonism’ are used here in the sense proposed by Chantal Mouffe. Mouffe argues that a 
Schmittian friend/enemy distinction is fundamental to politics, liberal democratic politics 
included - “the very condition for the constitution of an ‘us’ is the demarcation of a ‘them’” 
(Mouffe 2013: 6). Under liberal democracy, however, this does not entail the destruction of 
the enemy: while “the antagonistic dimension is always present”, political opponents “are not 
seen as enemies to be destroyed, but as adversaries whose ideas can be fought against” 
(Mouffe 2013: 9, 7). While violent or disorderly conflict is relatively rare in the life of a 
complex society, social conflict more broadly - conflict motivated by relations of power and 
ownership, social exclusion and stratification, and access to resources - is a normal and 
irreducible reality. The task of liberal democracy is to sublimate these conflicts through 
representation, forestalling the possibility of destructive antagonism by allowing them to be 
expressed agonistically. Agonistic conflict, in Mouffe’s terms, is conflict between political 
forces which ‘can never be reconciled rationally, one of them needing to be defeated’, but 
which ‘do not put into question the legitimacy of their opponent’s right to fight for the victory 
of their position’ (Mouffe 2013: 9,7). 
An agonistic conflict exists where two adversarial forces with equal legitimacy 
contend within the political sphere for conceptually opposed policies (e.g. disarmament and 
rearmament). Agonism becomes antagonism at the point where a victory for one of the two 
forces is identified as incompatible with the continuing normal functioning of the political 
sphere, such that the exclusion of this position - and, crucially, the defeat of its partisans - 
becomes a necessity. A society in which antagonism is increasing will become less hospitable 
to orderly and consensus-oriented debate, promoting alternatives of conformity and 
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anathematisation (whether ideological or simply group-based). The end point is the 
degeneration of the political sphere to the point of collapse, with political competition 
supplanted completely by antagonistic opposition between mutually radicalised forces - the 
state itself included. 
This raises the question of the conditions under which such a destructive mutation can 
arise. The model presented here suggests that there are two key factors in the maintenance of 
agonistic conflict, in the absence of which agonism is likely to be supplanted by antagonism: 
conflictuality and resilience. Conflictuality is defined as the extent to which conflicts within 
society are accommodated agonistically within the political sphere: a zero-conflictuality 
society would give political expression to no conflict at all except for established 
antagonisms, so that any expression of internal conflict would constitute a disruptive shock. 
Resilience is defined here as the extent to which the political sphere sustains the resources for 
agonistic conflict: a zero-resilience society, combining an unaccountable government and a 
disengaged populace, would have no agonistic resources to deal with any disruption. 
There is an inverse relationship between the contribution made by conflictuality and 
resilience in sustaining agonistic conflict: the higher the level of conflictuality that 
characterises the normal workings of the political sphere, the less likely it is that a political 
development will represent a disruptive shock calling on the system’s resources for resilience. 
Conversely, the more resilient the political sphere is to shock events, the less pressure will be 
felt to embrace a higher level of conflictuality: given a sufficiently high level of resilience, a 
low-conflictuality society will experience many political developments as shocks, but will not 
face challenges in maintaining its version of political normality. 
 
Conflictuality: “No Fighting in the War Room” 
 
Conflictuality is a measure of the extent to which the political sphere reliably and sustainably 
offers expression to conflicts on multiple ideological axes, both at a time and over time. 
Conflictuality is strongly associated with democracy: “[w]hat characterizes democratic 
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politics is the confrontation between conflicting hegemonic projects, a confrontation with no 
possibility of final reconciliation” (Mouffe 2013: 17). Since societies and the conflicts within 
them inevitably change over time, democracy and conflictuality are also associated with 
change in the political sphere, including change breaking in from outside the political sphere: 
“democracy distinguishes itself from other regimes in that its elected political agents should 
be able to interact with challengers, with new political entities and their innovative collective 
action” (Ruggiero 2017: 595). However, conflictuality is a critical standard rather than an 
defining attribute of democracies: different democracies can be classified “on the basis of the 
elasticity of their structures and the degree to which they encourage political processes and 
social dynamism leading to change” (Ruggiero 2017: 595).  
A lack of conflictuality makes it more likely that the political sphere will suppress 
conflicts and fail to accommodate political demands. The political sphere of a 
low-conflictuality society has a fixed - and narrow - ideological vocabulary, and is closed to 
new political actors and concepts. A society of low conflictuality will construct most social 
conflicts as external to politics - as purely criminal, as pathologically irrational or as 
belonging to the private sphere; any excluded conflict that does take political form will be 
experienced as a shock. 
It is important to distinguish conflictuality from stability. A low-conflictuality society 
is politically stable, in the sense that the circumscribed regime of normal politics can easily 
perpetuate itself. An increase in conflictuality will lead to political polarisation being 
expressed more intensely and in more dimensions; however, for as long as these polarities are 
expressed agonistically, they reduce the likelihood that events expressing suppressed conflicts 
will be experienced as disruptive shocks. As della Porta notes, “[c]ountries with exclusive 
strategies are expected to experience conflict radicalisation, whereas an inclusive strategy 
tends to produce a moderation of conflicts” (della Porta 2018: 464). The danger in terms of 
societal radicalisation is not that disruptive voices are heard, but that they are misheard or 
silenced; not that one group calls for the defeat of another, but that this defeat is understood in 
non-political terms - criminalisation, violent repression. 
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In a high-conflictuality society new political issues emerge continually and are 
articulated in highly polarised terms, in shifting alliances often involving new political actors. 
A high-conflictuality society is politically unstable in the sense that its political sphere, 
responsive to changes within society, accommodates a high rate of political change. Such a 
society may or may not be resilient to shocks from excluded political conflicts, but will face 
few such shocks, since most social conflicts will be able to find political expression.   
Conflictuality can be assessed in two dimensions, considering a society’s political 
sphere at one time and its susceptibility to change over time. The first – synchronic - 
dimension of conflictuality is accommodated conflict: politics is understood in polarised 
terms, with multiple polarities overlaid on one another to produce shifting patterns of political 
alignment. This should be distinguished from party-political polarisation and from an 
aggressive style in general. Polarisation - on multiple axes - is characteristic of accommodated 
conflict, but these polarities are grounded in social polarisation(s) which (also) find 
expression within the political sphere; the polarisation of a two-party system may leave many 
social conflicts unaccommodated. Nor does aggression necessarily denote accommodated 
conflict: a high level of stylised, theatrical aggression, or personalised aggression 
demonstrated along party lines, may go along with a general lack of ideological polarisation, 
and hence low accommodation of conflict. A society high in accommodated conflict is 
characterised specifically by clashes of ideologies, in the political sphere and in society more 
broadly. In such a society, political debate is dominated by clashes between ideas rather than 
individuals; parties and social movements organise around political value propositions which 
are considered to be mutually exclusive, and consider political debates to be founded on 
irreconcilable oppositions. Conversely, a society low in accommodated conflict may be one 
dominated by a single ideology (stated or unstated) and/or one in which political conflict is 
entirely personalised. 
The second – diachronic - dimension of conflictuality is the permeability of the 
political sphere. Permeability is defined here as the capacity of a political system to 
accommodate new ideological positions and new formulations of existing positions.. An 
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impermeable system is one in which political directions are set, informally or formally, by 
existing holders of positions of power. A highly permeable political sphere, by contrast, is 
open to new political actors, new goals and programmes, and so ensures that political 
institutions offer some representation to conflicts developing within society. 
In the most conflictual societies, agonistic conflict is seen as a normal political 
phenomenon, while new forms and articulations of conflict can emerge at any time, by virtue 
of the permeability of the political sphere. In a highly conflictual society, not only does 
political and campaigning activity involve multiple direct, conceptual oppositions; it is 
possible for emerging interest groups and social movements to constitute themselves as 
recognised actors within the political sphere, even if they stand in overt opposition to rival 
forces.  
In the least conflictual or most pacified societies - with low levels of both 
accommodated conflict and permeability - the accepted agenda for political debate only 
acknowledges the existence of a set, and limited, number of agonistic conflicts, while the 
political sphere is insulated from change or revision in response to developments in society. 
Politically such a society is extremely stable: the political sphere can reproduce itself 
unimpeded. However, it is ill-equipped to process either the articulation of conflict in the 
political sphere or new conflicts arising in society at large, and hence faces a constant risk of a 
shock irruption of conflict into the political sphere. 
Intermediate forms between highly conflictual and fully pacified societies also exist. 
Societies with a high level of accommodated conflict and low permeability have a political 
sphere which is characterised by overt political conflict and genuine polarisation along 
multiple dimensions, but is not open to new entrants or new ideas; political debate is confined 
to the ‘caste’ of professional politicians and articulated in unchanging terms. Conversely, 
societies with a low level of accommodated conflict and high permeability are dominated by a 
single political ideology, which either excludes agonistic conflicts or articulates a fixed and 
narrow range of conflicts. Emerging political actors and interest groups can establish 
themselves as political subjects, but only within the bounds of the governing ideology. The 
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political language of such a society changes over time, but without any challenge to the tenets 
of political debate. 
A transition from high to low accommodation of conflict may be brought about by the 
imposition of a political settlement by a governing class after a period of disruption or by the 
consolidation of a dominant political clique. A transition from high to low permeability may 
mark the close of a period of disruption and high political turnover, as the boundaries of the 
political sphere are established, or else follow a process of political entrepreneurship which 
redraws the map of political debate. Each of these developments renders a society more 
vulnerable to radicalisation. Conversely, a transition from low to high accommodation of 
conflict may follow the discrediting of an overly restrictive political consensus, or of the 
liberalisation - or overthrow - of an authoritarian state. A transition from low to high 
permeability, lastly, may result from the erosion of a single party’s dominance or from the 
discrediting of a political class; alternatively, a reformist political sphere may embrace new 
and different agonistic conflicts and actors in response to pressure from social movements. By 
increasing conflictuality, these developments effectively deradicalise society.   
 
Resilience: Horizontal and Vertical Hold 
 
The second key variable in assessing vulnerability to societal radicalisation is resilience. The 
concept of resilience has been widely used in the analysis of responses to terrorism and 
radicalisation, both on the societal and the individual level. In both cases what was initially a 
simple and prescriptively valued concept of resilience - considered as a capacity for 
“returning to a state of equilibrium following some form of stress or adversity” (Stephens and 
Sieckelink 2019: 2) - has to some extent given way to more plural and nuanced 
understandings. Thus Malkki and Sinkkonen define resilience descriptively as “the way that 
continuity and transformation take place in the face of (specific) endogenous or exogenous 
shocks in all aspects of political life” (Malkki and Sinkkonen 2016: 286-7); this leaves open 
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the possibilities that resilience may involve transformation as well as continuity (Davoudi 
2012), and that a particular resilient response may have undesirable results (Bourbeau 2013)). 
We can distinguish between resilient responses themselves and their effects, which 
may tend to either stabilise or destabilise a society. Innes’s formulation, that “[t]errorism 
seeks to manufacture uncertainty to induce a reaction that destabilises a social order” (Innes 
2006: 223), whatever its broader validity as an assertion about terrorism, usefully 
distinguishes between the disruption caused by a shock event itself and the destabilisation 
which may be produced by a particular - transformative - resilient reaction;  this distinction is 
developed further, in the context of differing forms of societal resilience, in Edwards (2016), 
which also stresses that neither continuity nor transformation is inherently a desirable form of 
resilience. 
Discussion of individual resilience has travelled less far from its normative roots; to be 
‘resilient’ to radicalisation is generally seen in terms of a positively-valued imperviousness to 
undesirable influences. One useful and relevant distinction is made in Stephens and 
Sieckelink’s survey of professional literature in the field of Preventing Violent Extremism 
(PVE), which identifies rival conceptualisations of resilience (understood in this sense) 
among young people: “resilience as a shield” and “resilience through connection”. The 
distinction recalls the larger distinction between transformation and continuity as ‘resilient’ 
responses. On one hand, ‘shield’ resilience represents young people’s lives as continuing 
unaffected because they are impervious or oblivious to the appeal of the radicalising 
influence, and to this end encourages the inculcation of a “value framework that leads to the 
rejection of extremist ideas” (Stephens and Sieckelink 2019: 8). On the other, ‘connection’-
based resilience envisages young people as becoming more resilient by building 
“relationships of trust across society” (Stephens and Sieckelink 2019: 8); this in turn requires 
that young people are empowered to articulate all the stress factors which affect them and call 
on their resources for resilience, and empowered to respond accordingly. Fostering connective 
resilience thus requires “addressing the existential questions and concerns of the student” and 
“providing them with the tools and resources to affect change in their social and physical 
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environment” (Stephens and Sieckelink 2019: 14). In short, this model of resilience suggests 
that young people can develop the ability to respond to an external influence by situating it 
harmlessly within their established patterns of discourse, and encourages building capacity in 
reflective debate so as to achieve this. 
The model presented here considers resilience - like radicalisation - as a property of a 
society’s political sphere rather than of individuals. Despite the broader horizons of the 
descriptive sense of resilience, the model’s normative framing makes it appropriate to use a 
narrower, prescriptive sense here: resilience is considered as the capacity of a society’s 
political sphere to respond to a shock without affecting continuing agonistic conflict. ‘Shock’ 
events are defined as the class of events which “disrupt the polity by threatening to impose 
unpredictable costs on its continuing operation” (Edwards 2016: 292). Shock events are 
generally perceived as exogenous - as “originating outside the political system [or] initiated 
by forces not already recognised and legitimated as political actors” (Edwards 2016: 292). 
The lower a society’s resilience, the more likely it is that a shock event will lead to heightened 
antagonism. As in the ‘connective’ model of individual resilience, societal resilience is 
considered as a product of democratic capacity: a poorly functioning liberal democracy is less 
likely to be able to absorb a shock into its normal discursive political repertoire, and is 
consequently more liable to see agonistic conflict supplanted by antagonism. 
A society’s political sphere lacks resilience to the extent that shock events are likely to 
be met, not with an agonistic political response, but by framing the event in such a way as to 
put the political sphere on an antagonistic footing. A resilient society will not necessarily treat 
shock events as part of normal politics, bringing them within the scope of conventional 
political vocabularies; a low-conflictuality society may treat all challenges to its - relatively 
restricted - political vocabulary as symptoms of a variety of different social problems, or as 
nuisances needing to be removed. The key feature of a resilient democracy’s response to 
shock events is that they are not immediately treated as existential threats to normality, 
demanding a ‘securitising’ response involving the labelling of an antagonist. 
  
 
 
 
 
Phil Edwards: Antagonism, Conflictuality and Resilience: A New Model of Societal 
Radicalisation 
 
 
 
 
66 
Winter 2019/20 
Nr. 21 
ISSN: 2363-9849          
Societal radicalisation is seen as involving an increase in antagonistic conflict at both 
the individual and the governmental level; resilience thus involves factors which inhibit both 
the core and the periphery of the political sphere from the development of antagonism. The 
concept of a governmental drift into antagonism - radicalisation from above, or from within 
the core of the political sphere - builds on the ‘securitisation’ literature: what Buzan et al 
characterise as securitising moves (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998: 25) may form part of 
the process of replacing political exchange with antagonistic opposition. This understanding 
of securitisation follows a constructivist reading of security as a discourse; the state “speaks 
security for its society” in the sense that it names an issue or conflict as exceeding the 
capacity of non-securitised ‘normal’ politics (Williams 1998: 438; see also McSweeney 
1996). In other words, securitisation is considered as a form of discursive framing, albeit one 
which has a particular reach and claim to authority in society’s political sphere thanks to its 
institutional grounding (Watson 2012, Balzacq 2005).  By securitising a conflict, the state 
frames it in antagonistic terms, elevating it above the agonistic political sphere so as to allow 
the breaking - or suspension - of formal or informal rules governing normal politics (Bright 
2012): rather than a agonistic conflict with an ideological enemy, this is now an life-and-death 
confrontation with an enemy which must be defeated in order for society to continue. 
Resilience is hypothesised as having two key components, which can be considered as 
its ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ dimensions: democratic accountability (without which a 
government is more likely to make antagonistic responses to a shock event) and popular 
political engagement (without which citizens are more likely to endorse and adopt 
antagonistic labelling). In an active democracy, with both engagement and accountability at 
high levels, there is a general willingness to articulate unexpected issues as problems that are 
capable of political solution, together with a confidence that political problems will 
predictably and adequately be addressed by responsive government action. The higher a 
society’s levels of engagement and accountability, the greater the resilience to shock events. 
This argument builds on the argument formulated by Eyerman to the effect that 
“democracies decrease the price of non-violent legal activity and therefore increase the price 
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terrorism [sic]” (Eyerman 1998; see also Piazza (2017b), testing and partially confirming an 
association between terrorism and “closure of nonviolent opportunities for political dissent” 
(Piazza 2017b: 112)). However, what is being suggested here is not that a decline in 
democratic participation removes opportunities for rational actors to participate in politics and 
consequently incentivises violent protest, but a rather less extended causal chain whereby 
radicalisation affects society as a whole, and can be countered both by citizens having 
opportunities for agonistic political activity and by governments being restrained from their 
own drift into antagonism by established mechanisms of accountability. 
In societies of high popular engagement, essentially political questions - questions of 
the distribution of resources and power; of the constitution and recognition of collective social 
subjects; and of the purposes and goals of society as a whole - are seen as available for 
discussion in a variety of social settings. More importantly, these questions are seen as 
relevant to those social settings and to the resolution of disputes arising within them. A 
high-engagement society is a society with ‘politicised’ trade unions, ‘activist’ students and 
‘contentious’ social movements; in other words, it is a society where politics is not a spectator 
sport. High engagement may coexist with low conflictuality, as in societies whose citizens are 
regularly called on to affirm the same distribution of power and the same social goals. 
In a society of low engagement, by contrast, politics is the occupation of elected 
representatives and little else. Decisions on issues of distribution, recognition and social 
purpose are delegated entirely to the ‘caste’ of professional politicians; members of the public 
may discuss political issues in private conversation but have no consequential outlet. Areas of 
civil society which might provide opportunities for political engagement are either entirely 
lacking in activism or play host only to narrowly-focused, sectoral campaigns which do not 
bring wider issues into question: a trade union campaign to maintain wage differentials, a 
social movement campaign with the sole focus of preserving a local green space. Low 
engagement may coexist with a high level of conflictuality, as in a society where public 
apathy towards politics combines with the political representation of multiple ideological 
polarities (secularism vs religion, industrialisation vs environmentalism, etc). The presence 
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and absence of engagement is the difference between a society in which politics is 
experienced as an everyday reality and one in which, for most, it is observed as a spectacle. 
The second, ‘vertical’ dimension of democratic activity is accountability. 
Accountability refers to the extent to which the government (and the institutional core of the 
political sphere) can reliably be influenced by actors in the periphery of the political sphere, 
including trade unions and social movements. Accountability is not a measure of whether the 
government does in fact respond to popular campaigns, but of how confident any campaign 
can be that any given effort will be rewarded; capricious or ‘ex gratia’ responses, even if they 
are relatively frequent, do not represent any better accountability than a complete refusal to 
respond. High levels of accountability mean that - through whatever combination of legal, 
political and cultural factors - any substantial campaign or civil society organisation which 
raises political demands can be sure that they will be actioned. In a society with little or no 
accountability, by contrast, the autonomy of representative politics is insulated against 
pressure from below; there is no expectation among members of the public, or even among 
political activists, that their demands will be met on any given occasion (even if on some 
occasions they may be). 
Following the irruption of an excluded conflict through a shock event, a deficit in 
either engagement or accountability will create vulnerability. In a society of low engagement, 
few are accustomed to framing their experiences in political terms or seeking political 
resolutions - resolutions in terms of altered patterns of distribution or recognition - to the 
problems they face. In a society of low accountability, conversely, few have any confidence 
that significant political responses to social problems can be called for, or will be effective if 
tried. A shock event (such as a terrorist attack) will highlight the conflict which had been 
excluded and suggest that the political sphere is not working satisfactorily. Consequently, 
such an event will disrupt the orderly reproduction of the political sphere, highlight its deficits 
in resources for resilience, and put a premium on whatever resources it can call on. Whether 
because the government is not seen as being capable to deliver a political solution or because 
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thinking in terms of political solutions at all has become unfamiliar, a low-activity democracy 
will be liable to react by framing the source of the shock as an antagonist to be destroyed.  
The most resilient society is thus one with effective engagement and accountability: a 
society characterised both by widespread engagement in political and campaigning groups 
and structures and by a high level of confidence that political change can be demanded and 
will reliably be delivered. In such a society there is general confidence in politics as an arena 
for problem-solving, the construction and recognition of political subjects and the pursuit of 
wider goals. Shock events are treated as a sign that the scope of the political sphere should be 
expanded so as to absorb the political force being expressed, or else as a sign of pathological 
developments in an existing political conflict. It should be noted that an active democracy is 
not necessarily high in conflictuality or socially just; the disorder which is handled without 
disruption may represent the exclusion or repression of multiple social conflicts. 
The least resilient societies are those where democratic activity is lowest, lacking both 
engagement and effective accountability. Democratically inactive societies are characterised 
both by public disengagement from the authorised range of political practice (with activity in 
civil society taking purely non-political forms) and by mechanisms for accountability which 
are defective or non-existent. While the political sphere is functional on its own terms in 
normal conditions, any unexpected incursion on politics will challenge its capacity to 
maintain and reproduce itself, as the perpetuation of the political sphere is not guaranteed 
either by large-scale participation or by consciousness of its responsiveness to demands from 
below. 
Intermediate states between the fully active and wholly inactive democracies include 
societies with effective engagement but little or no accountability, and societies with an 
accountable state but a lack of popular engagement with politics. Wilson and Piazza’s finding 
that “the use of co-optive institutions enables autocracies to be more effective [than military 
regimes] at counterterrorism” (Wilson and Piazza 2013: 951) suggests that engagement 
increases resilience even in the absence of accountability; conversely, Aksoy et al’s finding 
that “dictatorships with active opposition political parties and no legislature are the most 
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prone to terrorism” (Aksoy, Carter and Wright 2012: 823) suggests that, of all low-
conflictuality regimes, it is those with both low accountability and low engagement that are 
most vulnerable to disruption. The political spheres of low-engagement and low-
accountability societies depend for their self perpetuation on accountability and engagement 
respectively; each is resilient to some types of shock but not to others. In a society of high 
engagement and low accountability, the shock of a disorderly political event is readily 
absorbed into the ‘background noise’ of public political engagement, unless the shock rises to 
a level where the state is called on to respond. In a society of high accountability and low 
engagement, by contrast, mechanisms of democratic accountability are functional but not 
widely used; in such a society, shock events are manageable to the extent that they, and the 
state’s response to them, can be handled without innovation in existing structures of 
democratic accountability. 
A transition from high to low levels of engagement may take place through the 
institutionalisation of representative political organisations and their effective absorption into 
state structures - for instance through the ‘occupation of the state’ by a political party - or by 
the professionalisation of radical and ‘alternative’ campaign groups. The defeat and 
exhaustion of radical social movements will also lead to a decline in engagement, as in the 
negative outcome of a ‘protest cycle’ or ‘cycle of contention’: in this scenario, political 
gatekeepers engage contentious social movements in exclusive rather than inclusive terms, 
narrowing their own political repertoires so as to preclude any concessions and hence leaving 
society with a more restricted repertoire (Edwards 2009). Institutionalisation and the 
‘occupation of the state’ may also bring about a transition from high to low levels of 
accountability, through the atrophy of democratic mechanisms. Less pathological forms of the 
same transition can be seen when a party’s rapid success outgrows its internal democratic 
structures, or when mechanisms of accountability fall into disuse as patterns of political 
engagement change; an example of this second process is the disjuncture that can develop 
between radical grassroots union activists and a hierarchy integrated into the bureaucratic 
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political sphere. Each of these transitions tends to reduce resilience and hence increase 
vulnerability to radicalisation. 
Conversely, a transition from low to high engagement is possible through the 
emergence of popular campaigning organisations in a society whose conventional political 
sphere attracts little engagement; higher engagement may also be achieved through the 
democratisation of existing representative political groups. More disruptively, societies may 
also transition from low to high levels of accountability, for example following the collapse of 
an existing political settlement and the discrediting of its existing caste of professional 
politicians. Although some are destabilising in the short term, these transitions all increase the 
resilience of the political sphere and hence reduce vulnerability to radicalisation. 
 
Conflictuality and Resilience: A Typology 
 
Drawing together the threads of the foregoing discussion, conflictuality (based on the political 
sphere’s permeability and accommodation of agonistic conflict) and resilience (based on state 
accountability and social engagement) can be combined in a four-way typology. 
A conflictual state is defined in terms of the representation of multiple agonistic 
conflicts in the political sphere together with the relative permeability of the political sphere 
to new entrants, and hence the relative normality of political change. A society can be classed 
as conflictual on the basis of high levels of accommodation of agonistic conflicts and of 
permeability, or because it possesses one characteristic to a high and the other to a growing 
degree (high permeability with a growing number of agonistic conflicts, or a high level of 
agonistic conflict together with growing permeability). While a conflictual state is not at risk 
of radicalisation, conflictual states are liable to polarisation and continual political change, 
which may be experienced as instability.  
A pacified state is one in which the political sphere is not permeable to new entrants, 
ensuring that political change is very limited, while few or no ideologically-driven agonistic 
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conflicts are accommodated within politics. A society can be classed as pacified either 
because both these negative conditions apply or because one applies while the other exists in 
substantial and growing form - entrenched exclusion of agonistic conflicts together with 
declining permeability, or established impermeability with declining agonistic conflict. 
Although stable, a pacified state is at much greater risk of radicalisation than a conflictual 
state. 
A democratically active society is defined in terms of the combination of ‘horizontal’ 
political engagement and ‘vertical’ democratic accountability; this combination makes it 
highly resilient to shocks, which can be absorbed into the political sphere through 
democratically accountable state action or reflective popular debate, or both. A society with a 
high level of engagement with politics but with limits to the state’s accountability, or a highly 
accountable state presiding over a society with low engagement, can be classed as active, as 
long as the trend is towards greater accountability, engagement or both. 
Conversely, a democratically inactive society is one that lacks engagement and 
accountability, making it highly liable to be adversely affected - interrupting the reproduction 
of its political sphere - by the shock of an excluded conflict. A highly accountable state with 
low social engagement with politics - or vice versa - could be classed as inactive, on the basis 
that the trend was towards lower levels of accountability, engagement or both. 
 
This schematic outline allows us to identify four broad combinations of society types: 
 
 Popular Regime (political sphere is broadly pacified and active) 
 Popular Pluralism (political sphere is broadly conflictual and active) 
 Elite Regime (political sphere is broadly pacified and inactive) 
 Elite Pluralism (political sphere is broadly conflictual and inactive) 
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Figure 1: Conflictuality and pacification vs activity and inactivity 
 
The society type with the lowest liability to societal radicalisation is a conflictual 
society with an active democracy. In a society of Popular Pluralism (PP), political conflict and 
change is continual, with multiple different groups making directly opposed claims. However, 
high levels of political engagement give these conflicts a grounding in civil society and in 
individuals’ lived experience, ensuring that both the political sphere and political conflict 
itself are seen as normal and sustainable elements of the life of society; moreover, the 
democratic accountability of the state ensures that demands expressed within society will be 
actioned, so that no group or set of demands is entirely or permanently excluded. 
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At the other extreme, an Elite Regime (ER) - a society whose political sphere is both 
pacified and inactive - is highly vulnerable to radicalisation. In such a society issue-based 
debate is limited, with new political actors encouraged to enter the political sphere only by 
working within the existing ideological agenda; unrepresented political demands and 
identities are constructed as a political threat or reduced to criminality. As such, the ER is 
highly vulnerable to political shocks. Moreover, when a shock event permits an excluded 
conflict to find political expression, the continuing viability of the political sphere is not 
guaranteed either by public engagement with politics or by the democratic functionality of 
mechanisms of accountability; the response of the state is highly likely to take the form of 
antagonistic labelling. 
Intermediate forms of society are the society of Elite Pluralism (EP) - a conflictual 
society with an inactive political system - and the Popular Regime (PR) - a pacified society 
with an active democracy. An EP society shares the PP type’s level of political conflict and 
change, but without that society’s levels of accountability and/or engagement; an EP society 
is characterised either by disjuncture between a conflictual civil society and an unaccountable 
political sphere, or by public disengagement from a conflictual political sphere. In either case, 
an EP society is reliant on the inclusiveness of its pluralism - whether in civil society or at 
elite level - to avert radicalisation; it is liable to radicalisation at the point when an excluded 
conflict is asserted, either because civil society cannot process it or because the reform 
necessary to respond to it cannot be secured. In an PR society, by contrast, public engagement 
with the forms of politics is high and the state is responsive to citizens’ demands; however, 
the possibility of either conflictuality or change is excluded from the political sphere. This 
makes any excluded conflict a potential antagonistic threat, which can only be avoided by 
absorbing it into existing processes of engagement and accountability. 
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From Agonism to Antagonism: Understanding Antagonistic Amplification 
 
The significance of the model of societal radicalisation set out - somewhat schematically - in 
this paper is that it makes it possible to set aside unanswerable questions about the genesis of 
the radicalisation of particular individuals and ask new questions about radicalisation as a 
collective process, identifying associated mechanisms. (‘Mechanism’ is used here in the sense 
adopted by McAdam et al: “delimited sorts of events that change relations among specified 
sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations” (McAdam, 
Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 25), with the qualification that the elements at issue here are those of 
discursive practice: framings, rhetorics, repertoires of action.) Agonism calls to agonism and 
antagonism to antagonism: to the extent that a particular social group is labelled in 
antagonistic terms, to that extent the adoption of antagonistic rhetoric - or worse - by 
members of that group is a coherent and predictable choice. There are also implications for 
deradicalisation: to the extent that an ideology’s adherents are treated as legitimate 
participants, and potential victors, in agonistic political competition, to that extent ‘radical’ - 
antagonistic - versions of that ideology are not likely to arise or gain a following. 
Work remains to be done on identifying the mechanisms associated with radicalisation 
and deradicalisation in this model. One such mechanism which can be detected in multiple 
situations is that of cumulative reciprocal amplification of antagonism (hereafter ‘antagonistic 
amplification’). The process of antagonistic amplification involves a society’s political sphere 
being colonised and ultimately dominated by antagonism. Oppositions and polarities which 
could be accommodated within the political sphere are articulated in terms which deny the 
possibility of political resolution (e.g. refusal of any debate, insistence that opponents should 
be silenced or criminalised), or presented as an opposition between democracy itself and the 
enemies of democracy. The introduction of the discourse of ‘violent extremism’ in the second 
iteration of the UK government’s counter-extremism programme Prevent in 2009, with the 
implication that certain forms of ideology were inherently violent, can be seen as an example 
of antagonistic amplification (Edwards 2014). 
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The process begins when a force representing an excluded social opposition - one 
extreme of a polarity not represented within the agonistic political sphere - enters the political 
sphere, interrupting its self-perpetuation. In response to this shock, the conflictual force is 
framed - whether by the government, political organisations or the media - as an antagonist to 
society, needing to be suppressed. This may also involve a reframing of the shock event itself, 
as when the House Un-American Activities Committee reacted to the perceived threat of left-
wing writers in the US entertainment industry under the guise of combatting spying and 
subversion. Antagonistic amplification begins at the point where this securitising move 
succeeds, with the broad social adoption of this antagonistic labelling; this is particularly 
likely to happen if the conflictual force reciprocally adopts the antagonistic framing of itself 
and its relationship with its adversaries. The second and third stages may then repeat, 
labelling a wider range of groups and individuals associated with the excluded political force 
as ‘antagonists’; the process may also generalise from one agonistic conflict to another, 
labelling a second group of agonistic adversaries as antagonists in their own right. 
Antagonistic amplification is thus highly corrosive of democratic politics. 
The group identified as an antagonist in the second stage will generally be broader 
than the actual adherents of the position framed as antagonistic. It may be an existing group 
with some genuine associations with given ideological positions, as where the social 
conservatism of some Catholics is used to attack Catholics in general; or an existing group 
with no inherent ideological associations, as when Jews are linked to antisemitic stereotypes; 
or a wholly constructed antagonist projected out of the terms of the ideological opposition 
itself, as when anyone adopting a left-wing position is labelled as a ‘Communist’. Antagonism 
may be promoted deliberately and instrumentally, in defence of a status quo built on the 
results of past antagonisms (as when a party supported by White beneficiaries of racialised 
power structures promotes overt racism) or as a means of gaining short-term political 
advantage. Securitising moves - presenting the partisans of a particular cause or conflict as a 
threat to the continued existence of society - may have the function of promoting antagonism. 
It is also worth noting here that, just as any political issue can in principle be ‘securitised’ 
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(Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998: 23-4), no political position is inherently antagonistic in 
all times and all societies. 
The three stages of antagonistic amplification can now be considered in more detail. 
First, a society’s political sphere gives agonistic representation to some social conflicts but 
not others: in liberal democracies, conflicts represented agonistically are typically those 
between capital and labour or between different sectors of capital, while conflicts between 
(for example) religious belief and secularism, republicanism and monarchy or feminism and 
patriarchy have no direct representation. Unrepresented conflicts, unless they can be brought 
under the umbrella of an existing agonistic conflict, are seen as relics of former antagonistic 
oppositions which have now been entirely excluded, or else as apolitical - matters for private 
life, personal eccentricities or questions that might once have been political but are no longer. 
However apolitical the framing of an issue may be, it will usually be possible to associate one 
side of the conflict rather than the other with the status quo. (The Hanoverian succession is 
not currently a political issue in the UK; vocal partisans of the Electress Sophia could fairly 
be considered just as eccentric as their Jacobite counterparts (Tayler 2019). Nevertheless, the 
current royal house reflects the success of the Hanoverian rather than the Jacobite claim.) 
An excluded conflict breaks into the political sphere when partisans of the defeated or 
suppressed side of the conflict take action in such a way that political life cannot carry on as 
normal. As such, the irruption of an excluded conflict is an example of a ‘shock’ event: an 
event which demands to be understood in political terms but exceeds the political sphere’s 
capacity to deal with it. The incapacity of the political sphere to give any representation to a 
conflict on whose exclusion it has been predicated, together with the brute salience of that 
conflict in the wake of the incident, threatens to create a break in the self-reproduction of the 
political sphere: simply, it is no longer possible to carry on as normal. An incident like the 7/7 
bombings is the obvious example of a shock of this type; the ‘shock’ effect of terrorist 
incidents is not owed (primarily) to their effects, but to the fact that they represent the forcible 
irruption of an excluded conflict into the political sphere. However, as the example of the 
HUAC hearings suggests, violence is not definitive of shocks, and not all political disruptions 
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involving property damage or even loss of life will be experienced as a shock. Indeed, 
politicians in resilient societies may make the deliberate choice not to securitise an act of 
political violence and hence avoid framing it as a shock; cf. British Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher’s response to the 1984 Brighton bombing (Thatcher 1984). 
The third stage of antagonistic amplification is the general adoption of the antagonistic 
labelling. This is usually supported by the conflictual force’s reciprocal adoption of 
antagonistic framing: antagonistic labelling applied to a conflict restricts - and, if successful, 
removes - the conceptual space for anyone involved to define it as anything other than 
antagonistic. There is a ‘secondary deviance’ effect (Lemert 1967): many potential agonistic 
adversaries will adopt the identity of ‘antagonist’ if it is imposed on them, purely because 
opportunities for agonistic conflict have been removed. Once established, an antagonistic 
opposition is likely to produce further polarisation, with the danger that other agonistic 
conflicts will be converted to antagonisms. In societies where the ‘left/right’ agonism has 
taken on antagonistic properties, this has often been the result of an antagonistic amplification 
process which began in a separate conflict: in the UK, the anti-nuclear movement, the 1984/5 
miners’ strike and the Irish conflict all led, through processes of antagonistic amplification, to 
the application of antagonistic labelling to the Left. 
Not all societies are equally vulnerable to antagonistic amplification. High-
conflictuality societies are not liable to the irruption of excluded conflicts into the political 
sphere; high resilience societies do not respond to shock events with a lurch into antagonism. 
Any of the developments identified as constituting a decrease in conflictuality - such as the 
repression of ideological conflict or the monopolisation of the political sphere by a single 
party - can be seen as increasing society’s liability to antagonistic amplification, even if it 
appears to promote stability in the short term. Similarly, a decline in either government 
accountability or public engagement in politics will reduce society’s resilience to shock 
events, making an antagonistic response more likely if they should occur. 
Conversely, measures to increase permeability or to increase the level of 
accommodated conflict - by embracing new political actors, or by encouraging ideologically 
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polarised debates within the political sphere - will reduce susceptibility to antagonistic 
amplification, even if their short-term effect is to increase polarisation and the appearance of 
disorder in politics. Developments increasing society’s resilience - increased popular 
engagement, improved government accountability - do not ward off shock events, but make it 
less likely that a shock event will elicit an antagonistic response from the political sphere. The 
more polarities can be played out as agonisms within the political sphere, and the more buy-in 
the structures of the political sphere have, the more the initiation of antagonistic amplification 
can be avoided. 
However, the different components of security from antagonistic amplification - 
conflictuality and resilience - are not substitutable: a low-conflictuality society with adequate 
resilience does not become more secure by increasing its level of resilience, only by 
increasing conflictuality. Moreover, the constituent elements of conflictuality and resilience 
are only substitutable within limits: while the vulnerability of a society low in both 
engagement and accountability can be remedied by increasing either, a society with little or 
no public engagement with politics is inevitably vulnerable to an extent, however effective its 
mechanisms of accountability are. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The model set out in this paper is a contribution to the understanding of radicalisation and of 
the prerequisites for effective deradicalisation. It is presented here as a hypothesis awaiting 
testing. However, while it has yet to receive experimental validation, it marks a sufficiently 
substantial departure from existing thinking about radicalisation (while remaining grounded in 
the wider literature) to merit being presented in the form of this initial sketch. 
Radicalisation is considered here as a process taking place within the political sphere 
of a society, rather than within an individual; the model is thus distinguished from existing 
models of radicalisation, which are categorised as based on models of contagion, strain and 
group action. The model’s societal focus draws on earlier literature discussing mass 
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radicalisation (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008), identifying social factors influencing 
radicalisation (Piazza 2017a, Doering and Davies 2019) and analysing terrorist acts in cost-
benefit terms (Eyerman 1996, Piazza 2017b), but centres society rather than the individual. Its 
conception of societal radicalisation builds on, but ultimately breaks with, social movement 
scholars’ interaction-based understandings of radicalisation and terrorism (della Porta 2018, 
Tilly 2005), stressing discursive action as the locus of radicalisation rather than viewing the 
radicalisation of individuals and groups through their deployment of tactics and framings. 
Societal radicalisation is seen in terms of the erosion of agonistic politics and its 
replacement by antagonism, owing to deficits in conflictuality and resilience. Agonistic 
politics is defined in terms deriving from Mouffe (2013); conflictuality is defined as the 
extent to which conflicts within society are accommodated agonistically within the political 
sphere, while resilience is defined as the extent to which the political sphere sustains the 
resources for agonistic conflict. The concept of resilience used here also draws on the existing 
literature on resilience to radicalisation as an attribute both of individuals (Stephens and 
Sieckelink 2019) and of societies (Malkki and Sinkkonen 2016). Conflictuality is further 
hypothesised as having synchronic and diachronic elements - the political sphere’s 
accommodation of conflict at a given time and is permeability over time - while resilience is 
considered as the product of democratic activity both ‘horizontally’ (public engagement with 
politics) and ‘vertically’ (government accountability). The radicalising drift from agonism to 
antagonism, when promoted at government level, is also related to the literature on 
‘securitisation’ (Buzan et al 1998), seen as a framing procedure (Watson 2012) which elevates 
the ‘securitised’ issue above normal - agonistic - politics. Lastly, a mechanism for societal 
radicalisation - ‘antagonistic amplification’ - is identified, together with possible historical 
examples. 
An understanding of radicalisation as a societal process has major implications, 
whether this is taken as the whole picture or only a complement and corrective to individual- 
or group-based models. Given that the model as presented is an untested hypothesis, further 
work is clearly required. Operationalisation of the key variables - agonism and antagonism; 
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accommodation of conflict, permeability, political engagement, government accountability - 
is challenging but should not be impossible; this would make it possible both to validate this 
model against known historical examples of societal radicalisation and to resolve the question 
of its compatibility with dominant individualistic models of radicalisation. 
While it is important to understand the processes of indoctrination and recruitment 
through which vulnerable individuals can be induced to become ‘extremists’, ultimately the 
focus on individuals may detract from the necessary task of capacity-building on a social 
level. This model suggests that societies whose political spheres exhibit low accountability 
and engagement (and hence low resilience) together with low accommodation of conflict and 
permeability (and hence low conflictuality) are highly vulnerable to radicalising mechanisms 
such as antagonistic amplification - which affect the political sphere as a whole and hence 
make the visible radicalisation of individuals far more likely - and that this vulnerability will 
remain whatever interventions are made on the basis of contagion-, strain- or group-based 
understandings of radicalisation. If this is the case, addressing these societal deficits where 
they exist is the precondition of effective counter-radicalisation. 
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